David Hirst 15
t was supposed to deal an initial, crippling blow to that other non-state Islamist militia, the one based on Palestinian soil itself, that was becoming an increasingly coherent, disciplined and effective fighting force - and, though still lagging way behind it, more and more like the Hizbullah which it sought to emulate, and which, together with Iran, had helped to arm and train it. The missile was Hamas’s trademark weapon too. For years it had been lobbing the primitive, home-made, short-range Qassam into the Israeli border town of Sderot. But of late it had introduced longer-range types that could reach such major southern towns as Ashkelon, Ashdod or Beersheba. The idea behind the inaugural onslaught, said an Israeli defence analyst, had been ‘to kill as many people connected to Hamas as possible’ in the hope of persuading its leaders to ‘surrender or plead for a ceasefire’. That was why, ‘in planning to attack buildings and sites populated by hundreds of people, the Israeli Defence...