uk oligarchy
The United Kingdom and ternary gradualism
The case of the United Kingdom is of obvious interest, on the one hand because the monarchy
British was at the head of the first world colonial and industrial empire in
Nineteenth century and up to the mid-twentieth century, and secondly because it is about
sort of the opposite case to that of France. While the French trajectory is
marked by the break of the Revolution of 1789, and by multiple breaks
Monarchical, imperial, authoritarian and republican policies and restorations
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the British trajectory seems to be characterized by
Absolute gradualism.
However, it would be wrong to imagine that it is only by small touches
that the social and political organization of the United Kingdom has moved from
trifunctional to a proprietary logic, then to Labor logics and
subsequent neo-owners. The moments of rupture have an essential importance
which must be underlined, as they again illustrate the multiplicity of bifurcations and
possible trajectories, and the importance of crises and event logic
in the history of unequal regimes. Two points particularly deserve
to be reported: on the one hand the central role played by the fight for progressivity
in the fall of the House of Lords, especially during the crisis
fateful of 1909-1911; and on the other hand the importance of the Irish question in
the general questioning of the dominant order and the British inegalitarian regime
between 1880 and 1920, both in its tri-functional dimensions, proprietary and
quasi-colonial.
Let's start by recalling the general context. The British Parliament has
ancient origins, which are generally traced back to the 11th-13th centuries. The
Council of the king, made up of representatives of the high nobility and the high clergy, becomes
gradually and sometimes includes representatives of cities and counties. The
separation of Parliament into two chambers, the House of Lords and the House of Lords
common, is set up from the fourteenth century. These institutions reflect the
trifunctional structuring of the society of the time. In particular, the Chamber
lords consisted of members of both dominant classes, who initially
had an equivalent weight in the assembly: on the one hand the spiritual lords,
that is, bishops, archbishops, abbots and other representatives of the class
clerical and religious; and on the other hand the temporal lords, that is to say the dukes,
Marquis, counts and other representatives of the noble and warrior class. In the
medieval English texts theorizing social organization into three orders, such as
those of Archbishop Wulfstan of York, we find the same concern for balance as
we noted in the French texts7. The nobles must listen to the advice of
the wisdom and moderation lavished on them by clerics, who in return should not
to think of themselves as warriors and to abuse their power, otherwise
the whole legitimacy of the trifunctional system that could be threatened.
This equilibrium experienced a first decisive break in the sixteenth century. Following
conflicts with the papacy and the dissolution of the monasteries decided by
Henry VIII in the 1530s, the spiritual lords are sanctioned and see their
political role diminish. They then become clearly a minority in the
House of Lords, which will now be almost entirely controlled by the Lords
time. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the number of spiritual lords was thus limited to
26 bishops, while the temporal lords have 460 seats. The high nobility
has also succeeded in imposing, from the fifteenth century, the principle that almost all
seats of temporal lords are occupied by hereditary peers, that is,
say dukes, marquises, earls, viscounts and barons, passing on their
paternal to son, usually according to the rule of primogeniture.
This system gives this thin group durability and prominence
under the protection of both royal and electoral power and
issues of power and rivalry within the noble class (the bass and
mean nobility playing no role in the appointment and perpetuation of
peers). Of course, the king has always kept the theoretical possibility of naming
new lords, in principle without any limit, which in case of a serious crisis can
to allow complete control of the affairs of the kingdom. But in
practice, this right has generally been exercised with extreme caution, and the most
often in very special circumstances, under the control of Parliament, by
example as a result of the union with Scotland (1707) and Ireland (1800), which
led to the appointment of new lords (eg 28 peers and 4 bishops
in the Irish case, have
The case of the United Kingdom is of obvious interest, on the one hand because the monarchy
British was at the head of the first world colonial and industrial empire in
Nineteenth century and up to the mid-twentieth century, and secondly because it is about
sort of the opposite case to that of France. While the French trajectory is
marked by the break of the Revolution of 1789, and by multiple breaks
Monarchical, imperial, authoritarian and republican policies and restorations
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the British trajectory seems to be characterized by
Absolute gradualism.
However, it would be wrong to imagine that it is only by small touches
that the social and political organization of the United Kingdom has moved from
trifunctional to a proprietary logic, then to Labor logics and
subsequent neo-owners. The moments of rupture have an essential importance
which must be underlined, as they again illustrate the multiplicity of bifurcations and
possible trajectories, and the importance of crises and event logic
in the history of unequal regimes. Two points particularly deserve
to be reported: on the one hand the central role played by the fight for progressivity
in the fall of the House of Lords, especially during the crisis
fateful of 1909-1911; and on the other hand the importance of the Irish question in
the general questioning of the dominant order and the British inegalitarian regime
between 1880 and 1920, both in its tri-functional dimensions, proprietary and
quasi-colonial.
Let's start by recalling the general context. The British Parliament has
ancient origins, which are generally traced back to the 11th-13th centuries. The
Council of the king, made up of representatives of the high nobility and the high clergy, becomes
gradually and sometimes includes representatives of cities and counties. The
separation of Parliament into two chambers, the House of Lords and the House of Lords
common, is set up from the fourteenth century. These institutions reflect the
trifunctional structuring of the society of the time. In particular, the Chamber
lords consisted of members of both dominant classes, who initially
had an equivalent weight in the assembly: on the one hand the spiritual lords,
that is, bishops, archbishops, abbots and other representatives of the class
clerical and religious; and on the other hand the temporal lords, that is to say the dukes,
Marquis, counts and other representatives of the noble and warrior class. In the
medieval English texts theorizing social organization into three orders, such as
those of Archbishop Wulfstan of York, we find the same concern for balance as
we noted in the French texts7. The nobles must listen to the advice of
the wisdom and moderation lavished on them by clerics, who in return should not
to think of themselves as warriors and to abuse their power, otherwise
the whole legitimacy of the trifunctional system that could be threatened.
This equilibrium experienced a first decisive break in the sixteenth century. Following
conflicts with the papacy and the dissolution of the monasteries decided by
Henry VIII in the 1530s, the spiritual lords are sanctioned and see their
political role diminish. They then become clearly a minority in the
House of Lords, which will now be almost entirely controlled by the Lords
time. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the number of spiritual lords was thus limited to
26 bishops, while the temporal lords have 460 seats. The high nobility
has also succeeded in imposing, from the fifteenth century, the principle that almost all
seats of temporal lords are occupied by hereditary peers, that is,
say dukes, marquises, earls, viscounts and barons, passing on their
paternal to son, usually according to the rule of primogeniture.
This system gives this thin group durability and prominence
under the protection of both royal and electoral power and
issues of power and rivalry within the noble class (the bass and
mean nobility playing no role in the appointment and perpetuation of
peers). Of course, the king has always kept the theoretical possibility of naming
new lords, in principle without any limit, which in case of a serious crisis can
to allow complete control of the affairs of the kingdom. But in
practice, this right has generally been exercised with extreme caution, and the most
often in very special circumstances, under the control of Parliament, by
example as a result of the union with Scotland (1707) and Ireland (1800), which
led to the appointment of new lords (eg 28 peers and 4 bishops
in the Irish case, have
as many as a hundred seats in the House of Commons),
without upsetting the balance of power.
Multiple works have shown the extreme concentration of power and
earthly property characterizing the high English aristocracy within the nobility
European. It is estimated that by the end of the 19th century, around 1880, nearly 80% of
United Kingdom lands were still held by 7,000 noble families (less than
0.1% of the population), of which more than half by only 250 families (less than
0.01% of the population), a thin group that corresponded largely to
hereditary peers making up the House of Lords8. By comparison, the nobility
France held on the eve of the 1789 Revolution about 25% -30% of
earthly properties of the kingdom, in a context, it is true, where the class
ecclesiastic had not yet been expropriated.
Recall also that the House of Lords played a distinct role
dominant in British bicameralism until the last third of the nineteenth century.
Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth century, they were members of the Tory party
(conservative) or whig party (officially renamed liberal party from
1859), the majority of prime ministers and members of the government were
from the House of Lords. It was not until the end of Lord's long tenure
Salisbury, third marquess of the name, and Tory Prime Minister in 1885-1892 and
again in 1895-1902, for this tradition to be lost and for the leaders of
from the House of Commons9.
Above all, it must be emphasized that the House of Commons was itself
composed mostly of members of the nobility in the eighteenth century and during
most of the nineteenth century, until 1860-1870. Adopted following the
Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the dismissal of King James II, the Bill of Rights
had confirmed and protected the rights of Parliament, particularly
adoption of taxes and budgets. But this founding text had not changed anything at the
structure of Parliament and its mode of election: on the contrary, it has led to
a parliamentary regime that was fundamentally aristocratic and oligarchic.
In particular, all laws should always be adopted in the same
terms of both Houses, which gave the House of Commons a veto
lords (and thus to a few hundred hereditary peers) over the entire
kingdom, especially in tax and budgetary matters, and for everything
which concerned the right of property. In addition, the members of the House of
municipalities were still elected by a minority of owners. The rules
defining the electoral tax, that is, the amount of taxes that must be paid
or properties that had to be held to be eligible to vote, were complex
and constituency variables, and controlled by local elites
power. In practice, they favored landowners, whose influence
was further strengthened by an electoral division giving more seats to
rural areas.
In the early 1860s, about 75% of the seats in the House of Commons
The communes were thus always occupied by members of the aristocracy,
same as the latter represented less than 0.5% of the British population of
the époque10. On the benches of the Commons, there were representatives of the three
main traditionally distinguished components within the classroom
nobility of the United Kingdom: the peerage, the titled nobility (except patry) and the gentry
(untitled nobility). The school was well represented, especially in the form
younger sons of hereditary peers who, with some exceptions, had no chance
to have access to the House of Lords and often made the choice of a career
Parliament and Politics in the House of Commons, generally by being elected
a district where the family lineage held vast estates. We
also counted in the Commons the eldest sons of hereditary peers, pending
their place in the House of Lords. Salisbury was a member of the House of Commons
Commons from 1853, before taking up its seat in the House of Lords at the
died of his father in 1868, then became prime minister in 1885.
Among the deputies elected to the House of Commons a large number of
members of the titled nobility, and in particular baronets and knights
(Knights). This component of the nobility played no direct political role in
United Kingdom and did not enjoy any special legal or tax privileges, but their
title was nevertheless protected by the British State, and its members occupied a
formal place of choice in official processions and ceremonies, just
behind the hereditary peers. It was an extremely prestigious group,
hardly more than to which the monarch could choose to give
access by letters patent, following a procedure similar to that used for
appointments among the lords. The monarch could in principle carry out
appointments without limitation of numbers, but in one case as in the other there
always proceeded in moderation. In the early 1880s, the kingdom
thus included some 856 baronets, who placed themselves immediately below
460 hereditary peers from the House of Lords, followed by a few hundred
knights. The baronet title could also be used as a gateway to the payroll,
for example, in the case where peer lines disappeared without descendants. He does
the object still today of an official list, the Official Roll of the Baronetage
held by the UK Department of Justice11.
Finally, the House of Commons also had a large number of
members of the gentry, that is to say, the untitled nobility, who formed the group
numerically the most important within the British aristocracy to the eighteenth and
Nineteenth century, but which had no official existence of any kind, not even a
title recognized by the state or a place in processions and ceremonies.
The British aristocracy, a nobility
propriétariste
This structure of the British aristocracy into three groups (peers sitting at the
House of Lords, nobility titled except patry, gentry without official status) explains
besides, why is it so difficult to estimate in a perfectly precise manner
the evolution of the size of the nobility in the United Kingdom. The difficulties are of a
nature slightly different from those encountered in the case of France. At
Eighteenth century, the French nobility as a whole had a legal existence,
since all its members had political privileges (such as
choose the representatives of the nobiliary order at the states general), fiscal (as
the exemption from certain taxes such as size) and jurisdictional
seigniorial justice). But the state of nobility was first defined at the local level,
under conditions and in ways that have left disparate traces and
difficult to compare across provinces, so there are uncertainties
the total size of the group12. At the same time, the nobility
British group had on the one hand a slender nobility titrated (less than 0.1% of the
population), which included the hereditary, privileged
considerable political pressure, starting with the Chamber's right of veto
lords on all of the kingdom's legislation until 1911, and immense
land areas; and on the other hand the untitled nobility (gentry), which was by far the
more numerous, since it is generally estimated that the total size of the class
nobility was around 1% of the population in the 18th century and less than 0.5% in
the end of the 19th century (see Figure 5.2), but which had no legal existence
officielle13.
The gentry formed a class of prosperous proprietors, although broader than the
tiny British titled nobility but otherwise finer than classes
plethoric of little Spanish, Portuguese or Polish noblemen. Even if she does
did not have explicit political and fiscal privileges, it is clear that the
gentry benefited greatly from the UK's political regime. The
gentry consisted mainly of descendants of the younger branches of the lineages
titled (peers, baronets and knights), and more generally from groups
old Anglo-Saxon warrior and feudal classes, enlarged to new
groups of possessors, based on alliance and recognition strategies.
The rules determining the right to vote for elections in the House of Commons, as defined in
local level, generally favored land ownership and benefited
so indirectly the members of the gentry who had kept an important
earthly domain in relation to members of the new bourgeois classes and
merchants whose wealth was exclusively manufactured, urban or
financial.
But the central point is that the boundaries between these different groups of
owners were relatively porous: no one knew for sure where
began and where the gentry ended, which was only defined by the fact that
members were recognized as such by the other members of the group at
local. In practice, many land and aristocratic fortunes were
gradually reinvested in market, colonial or
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, so that many members of the
the gentry had diversified heritages. Conversely, many bourgeois
authentic and ancient merchants, with no feudal or warrior origins of any
so, had the good taste to acquire a soil earthen domain IDE, to adopt the mode
of adequate life and to marry properly, so as to enter
undisputed in the gentry14. An alliance with authentic descendants of
ancient warlike and feudal lineages, or with children of the nobility
more recent title, facilitated recognition as a member of the gentry, but this
was not an indispensable condition. The social and political system in force at
United Kingdom in the eighteenth century and for most of the nineteenth century reflected in
to a large extent a form of gradual fusion of aristocratic logics and
propriétaristes.
The conditions for the exercise of the right to vote were also defined by the
elites at the local level. It was not until 1832 that a first real attempt
electoral reform and national legislation. Social protest and
the mobilisations for the extension of the electoral "franchise" led to
that a law be passed for the first time by Parliament, not without resistance.
Some members of the Commons saw this as an opportunity to increase their
legitimacy against the Lords. The number of voters, which represented around 5% of
adult men in 1820, a distinctly smaller but significantly larger group
wide as the only gentry, increased significantly as a result of the 1832 law, all
remaining relatively weak, and clearly a minority. It was about 14% of the
adult male population in 1840, with considerable regional variation,
because the constituencies retained the privilege of defining the exact rules
governing the right to vote, depending in particular on the strategies of local elites, and
especially the gentry. These rules were no longer modified until reforms
truly decisive elections of 1867 and 1884. It should also be noted that the
secret ballot was not introduced until 1872. Previously each individual vote was
announced publicly and kept in registers (which can always be
to consult today, which is also a valuable source for
researchers). Before that date, it was not always easy for voters
display policy choices contrary to those of the owners or employers
the most powerful in the county. In practice, a large part of the seats were
challenged: the local deputy was reelected from election to election, and often from generation
in generation. In the early 1860s, the House of Commons had
a deeply aristocratic and oligarchic nature.
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