china and japan ending

What is the nature of the new era that China and Japan face, now
that China occupies the dominant position in the relationship? How might
the two nations work together in the new era for the benefit of both nations
and the rest of the world?
Sino-Japanese
Relations after
2014
Until
the arrival of Western explorers, merchants, and missionaries, China
and Japan were
linked in a loose regional order dominated by Chinese
civilization. But now the two countries are part of a global order, which,
though highly imperfect, operates according to a far more complex structure
of rules and procedures that were
originally established by Western
countries. Even as China surpasses the United States to become the world’s
largest economy, it remains part of this global structure created by Westerners.
As China gains influence and leverage around the world, it is beginning
to take on a larger role within existing organizations.
It is taking
the lead to form new regional and global institutions that, despite being
established by China, operate less in the way China has traditionally dealt
with the outside and more like the institutions established under
the leadership
of the United States and other Western countries. Japan, which has
been subordinate to the United States since the days of the Allied Occupation,
remains a major global economic power and will
continue working
within the framework of the U.S.-Japan
Security Alliance. But since the
administration of Donald Trump, which is loosening its links to regional
and global institutions, Japan is gaining more independence
and beginning
slowly to take more initiative in its global political
role and in its relations
with China.
Facing the New Era
. 405 .
People
in China and Japan now have far more contacts with each other
than they had at any time in history. Due to the advances in industrial production
and transportation that spread to China in the early decades
after
reform and opening began in 1978, the scale of goods and people
exchanged
between the two countries is more than a hundred times what it was in 1972,
when they first reestablished formal diplomatic relations. More goods are
exchanged, and more people
travel between the two countries, in a single
day now than in an entire decade
during the centuries of the Qing dynasty
(1644–1912) and the Tokugawa period (1603–1868). Between World War II
and 1972, trade between the two countries never reached $1 billion a year,
but by 2017 the countries were
trading $300 billion in goods per year.1 In
1965, the peak year for Japanese
visitors to China before normalization,
aside from some Japanese
visitors to the Guangzhou trade fair, fewer than
5,000 Japanese
travelers visited China during the entire year.2 In 2018, more
than 8 million visas were
issued to Chinese travelers going
to Japan and
more than 4 million visas were
issued to Japanese
individuals going
to
China. By 2018 an average of more than 20,000 Chinese visitors were
arriving
in Japan each day, and the number of tourists was continuing to grow.
More than 30,000 Japanese
companies now operate in China, far more
than companies from any other country. Pragmatic Chinese officials in
charge of local economic relations have been willing to work with the Japanese,
despite public expressions of anti-Japanese
sentiment. Japanese
companies
are also playing a role in supplying products to Chinese consumers
through e-commerce.
However, between the political
leaders of Japan and China, the level of
trust and empathy and the number of frank discussions is low compared
with those
between the leaders of other major nations, and the nature of
their exchanges tends to be more formal. No high-level
political
leader on
either
side has close friendships with or deep knowledge about the people
in the other country. Top leaders of the two nations occasionally have their
own brief side meetings at gatherings of regional or international organizations,
but long discussions between them have not taken place more than
once every
five years. By Chinese standards for welcoming foreign guests,
Japanese
officials are often not given honored treatment, and sometimes
they are not received at all.
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. 406 .
Until
the Sino-Japanese
War of 1895, most Chinese people
living outside
of the major east coast cities were
hardly aware of Japan’s existence. Even
during the Sino-Japanese
War of 1937–1945, unlike those
living near large
cities or Japanese
military camps, the 80 percent
of the Chinese population
living in rural areas without access to radio had little awareness of what
Japanese
soldiers were
doing
in China. Now, every
day, virtually everyone
in both Japan and China has access to electronic media presenting news or
stories about the other country. In China, state media officials supervise
the content of information presented to the public, and between 1992 and
2014, images of Japanese
aggressors were
widely available to Chinese
viewers. Japan did not have an organized
propaganda department as it did
during World War II, but coverage of China in the Japanese
media included
televised pictures of Chinese protestors throwing stones at Japanese
shops in China, and Chinese ships and planes harassing Japanese
ships near the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands. The result of such media coverage
in both countries was a widespread, mutual public antagonism that peaked
between 2010 and 2014. Yet as Chinese incomes began to rise, Chinese
people
acquired a high regard for Japanese
industrial products.
The extensive personal contacts and economic relations between
China and Japan thus rest on a fragile foundation that is threatened by
widespread popular
hostility and the changeability of political
leaders who
lack trust in their counterparts
in the other country. Since much of the
passion in Sino-Japanese
relations is deeply rooted in perceptions of history,
it will
be difficult for the two countries to place their relations on a
more solid, stable base, unless
they deal with the volatile emotions stemming
from history.
Concerns of Chinese Leaders and Their Use of History
The concerns that Chinese leaders have about Japan are reflected in the issues
they raise about history. The three most common issues raised by
Chinese leaders are: visits by Japanese
political
leaders to the Yasukuni
Shrine, Japan’s failure to acknowledge the horrors of the Nanjing Massacre,
and the failure of Japanese
textbooks to describe accurately the Sino-Japanese
War. What are the concerns underlying
China’s focus on these
issues?
Facing the New Era
. 407 .
The Yasukuni Shrine
Although many Japanese
leaders have expressed goodwill toward
China
during the past 125 years, ultimately China suffered greatly from attacks by
Japanese
troops, not only from 1937 to 1945 but also during the Sino-Japanese
War of 1894–1895, the Ji’nan Incident of 1928, the Manchurian
Incident of 1931, and the Shanghai Incident of 1932. Chinese leaders recall
the efforts by Toyotomi Hideyoshi to march through Korea
to capture Beijing.
They see in Japanese the samurai warrior spirit and the willingness
to die for their country. They are concerned that Japan might again become
an aggressive militarist power, and they do not believe that Japan’s declarations
of its peaceful intent are a reliable predictor of its behavior.
Therefore,
they are alert to any signs that militarists might once again rise to
power in Japan. They are sensitive to discussions of increasing military
expenditures, to proposals to eliminate Article 9 in the Japanese
Constitution
forbidding the use of war as a means of settling international disputes,
and to the activities and statements by right-wing
activists.
For the Chinese, the enshrinement in the Yasukuni Shrine of the souls
of Japanese
military figures who were
tried as class-A
war criminals after
World War II signals that the Japanese
still respect
those
who took part in
attacking China. Japan’s failure to separate the war criminals from the place
where others
who died serving Japan are enshrined is seen by the Chinese
as reinforcing the readiness of young Japanese
to sacrifice themselves for
their country. Knowledgeable Chinese are also aware that the Yushukan
Museum at the Yasukuni Shrine glorifies Japanese
military achievements.
Having suffered from Japanese
military aggression, China’s leaders are
acutely concerned when they see any sign that Japan might be becoming
more militaristic. For them, the return of the souls of Japanese
war criminals
to the Yasukuni Shrine, and visits made by Japanese
political
leaders
to the Yasukuni Shrine since then, arouse fears that a militaristic spirit is
being revived. From the perspective of the Chinese, the actions of Japanese
leaders—visiting
the place where Japanese
war criminals are enshrined—speak
louder about Japan’s true intentions than their “empty” words about
peace.
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The Nanjing Massacre
To the Chinese, the Nanjing Massacre represents the vicious nature of Japanese
warriors. Many in China are familiar with tales about the cruelties of
the Japanese.
The reports of the behavior
of Japanese
soldiers in Nanjing
resonate with what the Chinese have long heard about sword-swinging
samurai
and bloodthirsty Japanese
pirates.
When the Chinese hear statements by Japanese
scholars arguing that
not as many people
were
killed during the Nanjing Massacre as the Chinese
claim, they interpret them as playing down the seriousness of the crimes
that Japanese
soldiers committed in China. If the Japanese
try to soften the
horror of the atrocities committed by their troops, it creates doubts about
whether
they have really
turned their backs on the behavior
of earlier
generations.
The Textbook Issue
The Chinese are concerned that the next generation in Japan, rather than
being trained to denounce the militarist past, will
be susceptible to becoming
aggressors just like earlier
generations. If the Japanese
are really
turning their backs on their militarist past, the Chinese ask, why are they
not learning the lessons of history and renouncing their past behavior
in
what they teach their youth? Textbooks have become a visible,
concrete
symbol for the Chinese to evaluate how Japanese
students are being trained.
Knowledgeable Chinese are aware that the textbooks used in high school
social-science courses in Japan provide very little
background on the two
Sino-Japanese
Wars. In their view, the youth in Japan today
are not sufficiently
aware of the horrors that were
committed by Japanese
soldiers and
hence they do not thoroughly reject war making. If Japanese
youth were
to be drafted into military service
by their leaders and called to war, they
ask, might they not commit the same cruel acts as their grandfathers
and
great-grandfathers?
Facing the New Era
. 409 .
Chinese Leaders’ Limited
Contacts with Japan
Since World War II, China’s leaders, unlike Chinese students who have
studied in Japan, have had few contacts with the Japanese,
and therefore
they have not had opportunities to witness the depth of the Japanese
commitment
to peace. Their perspectives, like those
of the Chinese public in
general, are more deeply colored by memories of the Japanese
atrocities of
World War II.
Chinese Leaders’ Use of History
Leaders in China have drawn on their people’s
historical memories to increase
China’s leverage over Japan. The Chinese assumption has been that
when Japanese
leaders show signs of reviving militarism, strong complaints
and warnings will
eventually deter Japan from pursuing a military course.
When they see signs that Japan may be becoming more militaristic, they
warn the Japanese
of the anger of the Chinese people.
China’s leaders rallied
public opinion to protest Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro’s visit to
the Yasukuni Shrine on August 15, 1985, for example, on the fortieth anniversary
of Japan’s surrender to the United States. They set off an anti-Japanese
campaign when Japan announced plans in 2010 to try in a domestic court the
Chinese fishing-boat
captain who had rammed into two Japanese
vessels
near the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands. They organized
another anti-Japanese
publicity campaign in 2012 when Japan announced plans to “nationalize” the
islands.
The leaders of China have often called attention to Japan’s aggressive history
when pursuing specific goals. For example, when it appeared in the
1980s that Japan was hesitating to renew its programs to extend aid to China,
Chinese complaints about Japan’s handling
of history became more pronounced,
subsiding only after
Japan decided
to renew its aid. Many Chinese
individuals and Chinese businesses have also criticized Japan for its
past aggressions when they have failed to receive payments from Japanese
individuals or companies for other offenses.
When the United Nations was considering making Japan a permanent
member of the UN Security Council, the Chinese government opposed it,
arguing that the position would be unacceptable because
of Japan’s aggressive
china and japan
. 410 .
behavior
in the past. Chinese leaders mobilized their citizens to sign petitions
and to take part in public demonstrations against Japan.
Following the Chinese student demonstrations at Tiananmen
Square
in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 after
its own domestic
protests, Chinese leaders introduced the Patriotic Education Campaign to
encourage patriotism among the next generation. To help build national loyalty,
many articles appeared in the Chinese media that were
critical of
Japan for its treatment of China. The government also began using new
formats—movies,
video games, and other digital media—to display the
brutal behavior
of the Japanese
and thus build greater support among Chinese
youth for their leaders, who sought to protect their country from the
enemy.
In 2012, for example, the Chinese government approved the production
of 69 anti-Japanese
television
series and 100 anti-Japanese
films. Ever
since 1915, when China opposed Japan’s Twenty-One
Demands, Chinese
leaders have found anti-Japanese
publicity to be a useful tool for building
loyalty to the Chinese government and its leadership.
The Japanese
History Problem
The essence of the Japanese
history problem
is that although the Japanese
overwhelmingly wish to pursue the path of peace, their respect
for their own
ancestors and their determination not to bow down to China have prevented
them from satisfying Chinese demands. The Japanese
have rejected military
pursuits, but they want to respect
their fellow countrymen, and especially
their relatives, who sacrificed themselves for their nation. They believe
that if their ancestors did bad things,
it was not because
they were
inherently
bad people
but because
they faced difficult circumstances in which they had
little
choice.
Except for members of some right-wing
groups in Japan, the Japanese
strongly believe that it was wrong for Japan to invade China, and they deeply
regret that their nation caused so much suffering. But they also feel that
they have paid an enormous price—in the results of the massive aerial
bombing of their cities, the two atomic bombs dropped on Japan, and the
seven years of Allied Occupation. The dominant view among the Japanese
public is that, after
the war, the best way to deal with the suffering Japan had
caused in China was to offer assistance for China’s modernization program.
Facing the New Era
. 411 .
They are pleased that their country’s pursuit of peace and its generosity
toward
other countries have earned Japan a positive worldwide reputation,
except in China and Korea. In their view, Japan has made great
contributions
to China, contributions that have been inadequately acknowledged.
The Japanese
recognize that the Chinese are becoming stronger, both
militarily and economically.
In dealings with the Chinese, the Japanese
want to be treated as respected equals, not forced to submit to Chinese
demands. They also believe that the Chinese use anti-Japanese
rhetoric
as
a way of both maintaining domestic unity and extracting favors
from Japan,
and they respond negatively when angry Chinese leaders tell them what
they must do.
The Japanese
believe that the Chinese have used the issue of history to
achieve goals not in Japan’s interest. They have used it to issue demands for
more help and more payments from Japan. They have used it to gain cooperation
from other countries that also suffered from Japanese
aggression and
to pull them closer to China and away from Japan. The Chinese have done
this with Korea,
in particular,
but also with Southeast Asia and the United
States. The Japanese
have noticed that the Chinese have called attention to
the cooperation between the Americans and the Chinese during World War
II in confronting their common enemy,
Japan. The Japanese
were
deeply disappointed
that China used the history issue to keep Japan from receiving a
permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, in spite of the fact
that Japan was the number-two
contributor to UN funding and that since
1945 Japan has been pursuing the path of peace.
It has been difficult for Japan to find an effective way to react to accusations
of past aggressions. It has responded by saying that many of the complaints
about Japanese
behavior
are exaggerated. The Japanese
also feel it is
grossly unfair that they are still the focus of such criticism when Americans
are no longer constantly criticized for their actions against American
Indians, or Belgians for their acts in the Belgian Congo, or the British and
other colonial powers for behavior
in the colonies that they exploited. Why,
Japan’s younger generations ask, must they continuously apologize to the
Chinese for events that occurred more than seven decades
ago, long before
they were
born? In the Pew polling for 2016, 53 percent
of Japanese
respondents
said that Japan had apologized enough, while only 10 percent
of the
Chinese polled agreed.
china and japan
. 412 .
Facing History While Looking Forward
The current dialogue on history between China and Japan has focused on
the unfortunate side of the relationship. Less attention has been given to
the good relations between the two countries at times of great
cultural borrowing,
especially in the periods from 600 to 838, when Japan borrowed so
heavily
from China, and from 1905 to 1937 and 1978 through the 1990s, when
China borrowed so much from Japan. The two cultures have changed
throughout history, but there
remains a broad base of commonality in the
written language, literature,
Buddhism, Confucianism, art, architecture, and
music
they share, some of which is even incorporated into popular
culture,
and this could form the basis for continued cooperation in the future,
if permitted
by national policies.
Each country has placed more emphasis on its own contributions to the
other and its own suffering at the hands of the other. These
images have
been kept alive to strengthen loyalty to the nation and to the nation’s leaders.
The Chinese, especially through popular
Sino-Japanese
War movies,
have emphasized the negative side of Sino-Japanese
relations throughout
history. Many Chinese people
are convinced that the Japanese
are aggressive
by nature. In China’s patriotic narrative, the Sino Japanese
War of
1937–1945 is simply the latest chapter revealing the true Japanese
character.
In this view, the Japanese
are polite—on the surface. In the 1920s, for example,
the Japanese
talked about cooperation, but in the end they initiated
incidents and sneak attacks against both China and the United States.
The Chinese people
have little awareness of the positive side of their relationship
with Japan, of how much they have benefited from the “learn
from Japan” programs after
1895 and the “development assistance” programs
after
1978. They are not fully aware of the generosity of Japanese
aid programs
in the 1980s and 1990s. They are also not aware of the extent to
which Japan has apologized, or how thoroughly the Japanese
have renounced
militarism and pursued peace.
Throughout history the Japanese
have had a deep sense of the Chinese
as a proud and arrogant people
who demand subordination by other people.
Thus, ever since 607 the Japanese
have maintained a reluctance to bow down
to the Chinese and a determination to be treated as political
equals. For the
Facing the New Era
. 413 .
Japanese,
requests by the Chinese that they grovel in apologies represent
the latest version of China’s attempts to assert its superiority. The Japanese
are willing to apologize, but they are not prepared to bow down and apologize
in the way that the Chinese demand.
The Japanese
are aware of Japan’s positive contributions to China in the
modernization of Manchuria and Taiwan and its contributions to China
after
1895 and 1978. However, their collective historical memory directs less
attention to the harm and suffering Japan caused to China, an issue that is
constantly stressed by the Chinese. The Japanese
government at times has
not allowed textbooks critical of Japan’s aggression in China to be used in
its schools, and many publications and public discussions in Japan gloss over
the atrocities that Japan committed in China.
What Japan and China Can Do to Face History
Both countries could avoid aggravating the problems
that arise from history
by providing their citizens with a fuller and more accurate account of
their history and a more balanced presentation
of their current relations.
They could help their citizens better understand their long-entangled
history
in a way that acknowledges how much they have learned from each
other and reflects their positive experiences from working together.
The Japanese
prime minister and other senior
officials could decide that
they will
not visit the Yasukuni Shrine while they are in office. The Japanese
could also provide fuller accounts of the Sino-Japanese
War in curriculum
guidelines for compulsory high school history courses, in particular
by including the word “invasion” (shinryaku) in their textbooks. Japan
could produce more television
programs that give a full accounting of the
suffering inflicted on the Chinese people
by Japan’s invasions. The Japanese
people,
individually, could make greater efforts to understand the history
of Japanese
aggression in China, as well as to better understand Chinese
society and the attitudes of the Chinese people.
The Chinese could teach their students more about what China learned
from Japan between 1905 and 1937 as well as after
1978. They could give
the public a fuller account of the Japanese
turn to peace after
1945, Japanese
contributions to China since 1978, and the apologies already offered by
china and japan
. 414 .
Japanese
officials. They could reduce the number of anti-Japanese
movies
about World War II produced and shown in China and present
more
balanced descriptions of Japan in their museums, their classrooms, and the
media.
The Chinese could also study the example of Japan’s history in the first
half of the twentieth century
as a warning of what can happen as a country
becomes richer and stronger, when support for military expansion becomes
so strong that its leaders are unable to restrain superpatriotic passions that
can ultimately lead to disaster.
A New Vision: Warm Politics, Hot Economics
It has been customary for the Chinese and Japanese
to describe their relationship
as “cold politics, hot economics.” Despite poor political
relations,
they have extensive business relations. The question now is whether
the two
nations can build on their business relations and improve their political
relations.
Since 2010 the key leverage for improving relations has been in the hands
of the Chinese, because
China has suffered more and because
China now
has the larger economy and more global influence. Chinese leaders will
of
course consider how much it is in their national interest to work with Japan
on regional and international issues. A fundamental question is to what extent
Chinese leaders feel confident enough of the loyalty of their own
people
that they do not need to use anti-Japanese
programs to strengthen
nationalism among the populace. In the 1990s, war movies depicting Japanese
enemies were
an effective tool for strengthening patriotism, but their
production and use could be reduced as Chinese leaders feel more confident
of the patriotism of the public.
It is unrealistic, considering the depth of the historical passions involved,
that China and Japan will
quickly develop feelings of trust and become close
friends. That may be a goal for several decades
in the future.
A reasonable
goal for the next decade
would be to manage their relations in a straightforward,
frank, and businesslike way so that the two countries can become
reliable partners. It is unrealistic to expect that China and Japan in the next
decade
will
enjoy “hot politics.” But if they can continue to expand their coFacing
the New Era
. 415 .
operation in such enterprises as the Belt
and Road Initiative, in developing
joint projects
for solving environmental issues, and in multinational organizations,
it is not impossible that they could achieve “warm politics.”
A closer businesslike relationship between China and Japan should not
be a problem
for the United States. Some individual Americans might respond
with alarm, but their alarm would be misplaced. A reduction of tensions
between China and Japan, increased stability in the Western Pacific,
and contributions from both countries toward
maintaining world order are
all outcomes that accord with the interests of the United States as well as
those of other countries.
An Agenda for Sino-Japanese
Cooperation
From 2006 to 2008, leaders and representatives of China and Japan held a
series of meetings to discuss how their nations could work together for
their mutual benefit and laid out an agenda to achieve that goal.
In April 2007 Chinese premier Wen Jiabao visited Japan and gave a key
speech—in Chinese, translated for a Japanese
audience, and relayed back
to China, where it was broadcast to the public in the original Chinese. He
publicly stated what Japanese
leaders had long hoped a Chinese leader
would say. He acknowledged that on many occasions Japan’s leaders had
expressed their deep remorse and apologies, and he expressed appreciation
for Japan’s peaceful development. Premier Wen proposed four principles
for bringing Sino-Japanese
relations to a new stage: mutual trust, a
big-picture
perspective, common development based on equality and mutual
benefit, and strengthening exchanges with an eye toward
the future.
The agenda that Chinese and Japanese
officials then agreed to pursue
includes the following goals:
Expanded exchanges and dialogues among leaders, cabinet
ministers, and high-level
officials.
Exchanges of young people.
Reciprocal visits by the People’s
Liberation Navy and the Japan
Maritime Self-Defense
Force.
Cooperation on issues involving North Korea.
china and japan
. 416 .
Energy cooperation (including cooperation on energy conservation
and environmental protection).
Establishment of a ministerial-level
dialogue on energy.
Further cooperation in fields such as agriculture, intellectual
property rights, pharmaceutical
products, small and medium-size
enterprises, information and communications technology, finance,
and criminal justice.
This agenda from 2007 has great promise as a starting point not only
for the benefit of China and Japan but fot the benefit of global peace and
order.