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commercial society’. Tan imagined that in such a society ‘administrative power and ideological faith’ – i.e. the Party-state – would be disempowered by the effects of the economic reforms it implemented. Tan Yuliang also argued that even academic work would be eventually ‘swallowed’ by the commodification monster. As a precaution against this, his essay makes two suggestions to humanists in search of the spirit of the Humanities. To begin with, they should free themselves from their dependence on state power and achieve greater intellectual autonomy. Secondly, they should avoid overrelying on cultural models borrowed from the West and rescue instead elements from China’s pre-industrial tradition as the foundation of a new spirit of the Humanities (Tan Yuliang, 1994). Tan’s remarks highlight an overlapping between the narrative of commodification and that of cultural ‘homogenisation’ (Dirlik, 2001). Modernisation ‘Modernisation’ constitutes a key term in contemporary Chinese intellectual discourse. The Chinese word first appeared in the sense of transforming something according to the latest technology and fashion; its earliest occurrence in this sense is found in a 1928 work on Western art by Feng Zikai (1898–1975) ( JXC ). Feng, an influential figure in Chinese modern art, employed it with reference to the modernisation of architecture as a result of the introduction of new styles and techniques (Feng Zikai, 2004: 251). Defining ‘modernisation’ with reference to China implies taking a stand in a century-long debate on the position of this country in world history. Chinese intellectuals have discussed what modern is and how it is achieved since the late nineteenth century. The Self-Strengthening Movement (1860–1895), the Hundred Days’ Reforms of 1898, the ‘New Policy’ reforms of 1902–1911, the 1919 May Fourth Movement, the economic and military reforms attempted by the Nationalist government, and the reformist plans of Wei Yuan (1794–1857), Kang Youwei (1858–1927) and Liang Qichao (1873–1929) – just to name a few – all aimed to modernise China. This debate continues today. Does ‘modernisation’ simply entail making something acquire a modern and scientifically advanced quality, as a popular dictionary ( XHC ) defines it? Prominent economist Hu Angang (b. 1953) proposes a more comprehensive definition when he argues that a ‘modern’ state structure – i.e. ‘a socialist democracy in a society based on law’ – constitutes an essential component of modernisation (Hu Angang, 2003: 226). Political scientist Yu Keping (b. 1959) goes even further when he declares that modernisation requires a ‘thorough social transformation’ that includes industrialisation, a market economy, ‘democracy’ 23 and the adoption from the West of such values as freedom, equality and ‘the sovereignty of human subjectivity’ (Yu Keping, 2008: 158). In 1978 Wei Jingsheng (b. 1950) famously advocated the ‘fifth modernisation’ – that is, democratisation – alongside Deng Xiaoping’s ‘four modernisations’ (i.e. of agriculture, industry, defence and technology) (Brook, 1998b: 19). A state of flux 37 Based on the corpus, the meaning of ‘modernisation’ for the participants consisted in a blend of scientific and technological progress, economic reform and, occasionally, democratic change. Some prominent participants in the Reading panels expressed scepticism on the meaning of this word. Chen Sihe (Zhang Rulun et al., 1994b: 50–51), Zhang Rulun (in Zhang Rulun et al., 1994b: 53) and in 1997 Wang Xiaoming (2000: 445) all considered ‘modernisation’ a moot and contentious concept. In an article published in Guangming Daily , Meng Fanhua argues that ‘modernisation’ should mean more than economic and scientific development (Meng Fanhua, 1995). Combining a concern for societal ethics with the admission that China was enjoying a phase of positive development, he assumes that ‘probably nobody doubts that massive socio-economic development necessarily entails transcending the basic framework of traditional morals’. At the same time he maintains that ‘socio-economic development does not require renouncing the ethical values that form the basis of human society as the inevitable price to pay’ (Meng Fanhua, 1995: 7). Observing the demise of traditional values, Meng Fanhua wonders whether China’s fast-paced development leaves any room for ethical thought, as such development is driven – in his view – by ‘modern science and technology’. Citing Gilbert Rozman, Meng asserts that modernisation represents a process of transformation brought about by scientific and technological revolutions. ‘The experience of already-modernised societies shows that modernisation is best considered as a process affecting all aspects of society.’ 24 The statement, which Meng attributes to Rozman without specifying the source, is taken from the introduction of an edited volume on ‘the modernisation of China’ (Rozman, 1981: 3). Meng concludes: Modernisation means not only maximum material wealth and advanced political democracy, but also the advanced civilisation of the cultural spirit. (Meng Fanhua, 1995: 7) Meng Fanhua’s use of Rozman’s statement on modernisation is an example of how contemporary Chinese intellectuals sometimes borrow positions and concepts from Anglophone Chinese Studies for their debates. During the Reading panels, for example, Zhang Rulun cited Benjamin Schwartz’s In Search of Wealth and Power (1964) to criticise Yan Fu (1854–1921) and, by analogy, what he considered to be a distorted interpretation of political liberalism by contemporary Chinese humanists (Gao Ruiquan et al., 1994: 75–78). As Meng’s article and this book illustrate, this practice can result in an intertextual loop between Chinese intellectual discourse and Anglophone academic writing on China. The concept of modernisation in China is complexly related to the country’s encounter with the West since the Opium Wars (1839–1860). Yu Keping’s definition of the term, mentioned above, exemplifies how the controversial link between ‘modernisation’ and ‘Westernisation’ endures. In 1988 the TV series Yellow River Elegy ( He shang 河殇) stirred controversy when it advocated rescuing Chinese civilisation from its decline by means of modernisation and Westernisation (Su Xiaokang and Wang Luxiang, 1991). During the late 1980s several intellectuals shared the view that modernisation implies at least some degree of Westernisation. In 1987 the astrophysicist and foremost reform advocate Fang Lizhi (1936–2012) observed that an ongoing debate on modernisation pitted supporters of ‘partial Westernisation’ against those of ‘complete Westernisation’ and declared to agree with the latter side (Fang Lizhi, 2000: 513). During the debate, Qu Weiguo (b. 1958) criticised the Reading panellists for failing to realise that ‘the so-called modernisation is to a large extent Westernisation’ (1994: 51; see also Chapter 3 ). A similar point was made by Chen Yinshi during the Reading panels (Zhang Rulun et al., 1994b: 50–51). During the same dialogue Chen Sihe addressed the relation between the concept of modernity and the West. The literary historian argued that the equivalence between ‘modernisation’ and ‘Westernisation’ was tacitly accepted by most Chinese people for a long time after the Opium Wars (Zhang Rulun et al., 1994b: 50–51). Modern Chinese intellectuals, however, only vaguely defined the ‘content’ of the West that China was supposed to emulate in order to ‘modernise’, he lamented. For some it consisted in technological progress, for some in institutions and political systems, and for others in philosophies and cultures – with a considerable confusion on the boundaries between these realms. Especially after 1992, Chinese intellectuals have put under increasing scrutiny the association of modernisation with Westernisation. It is safe to say that today the project of a fully fledged ‘Westernisation’ of China is rejected not only by the political elite, but also by many intellectuals. In 1994 Liu Kang associated the modernisation-Westernisation equation with the intellectual mindset of the 1980s, contrasting it with the ‘nationalisation’ ( minzuhua 民族化) trend of the 1990s (Liu Kang, 1994). In 1996 Nanjing University historian Qian Chengdan (b. 1949) stressed that modernisation does not necessarily entail Westernisation, but in non-Western countries it is linked to the global expansion of Western-style industrialisation. Qian also believed that for non-Western countries like China, modernisation was an urgent and unavoidable task that required strong state power and the ability to learn from the mistakes of developed countries (Qian Chengdan, 1996). During the 1990s, Chinese intellectuals operated a shift from a discourse on ‘modernisation’ to one on ‘modernity’ ( xiandaixing 现代性) as well as a critique of the idea of modernity itself (Xu Jilin and Luo Gang, 2007: 21–26). Wang Hui was among the intellectuals who contributed to shift the debate from the issue of how to modernise to how to define ‘modernity’, arguing that the concept of ‘modernisation’ is discredited by the teleological and Eurocentric ideology it embodies (e.g. Wang Hui, 1995). In the final analysis, ‘modernisation’ was a salient theme in the debate, but not one at the centre of the participants’ concern. In all of its diverse definitions, ‘modernisation’ constitutes a narrative of projects or trends towards improving society, whether politically, economically, administratively or technologically. The debate, however, was focused on the role and ethics of China’s humanism rather than on the socio-economic future of the country. As far as the wider society A state of flux 39 was concerned, the participants generally hoped for its ethical and cultural betterment and did not discuss plans of socio-economic or political transformation. For this reason, the debate hardly addressed the issue of how to define and realise ‘modernisation’. Chapter 6 will show how participants were more concerned with China’s relations with the West. Secularisation I translate shisuhua as ‘secularisation’, 25 but the usage of this word in the corpus has little to do with how ‘secularisation’ is commonly used in English, i.e. with reference to the relation between religious institutions and social life. Many participants used this term with reference to beliefs and dogmas they perceived as vanishing, but said beliefs were of a political and cultural nature, rather than religious. This usage of the word reveals a semantic overlapping between the sacred and the political. Hallin and Mancini similarly defined ‘secularisation’ as ‘the separation of citizens from attachments to religious and ideological “faiths”’ and the ‘decline of a political and social order’ based on institutions such as churches and political parties (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 263). The debate linked secularisation to the diminishing importance of political ideals and the substitution of ‘transcendental concerns’ in literature and the arts with the pursuit of instant and tangible benefits. Participants like Qin Jin viewed the spirit of the Humanities as a way to counter this trend: The call to revive the spirit of the Humanities becomes stronger by the day, as literary critics begin a deep critique of the secularisation trend. (Qin Jin, 1995: 2) In a political sense, ‘secularisation’ denoted the post-1978 demolition of Maoist orthodoxy as a function of the ideological legitimation of Deng’s reforms. Wang Hui maintains that ‘like the critique of religion by Western humanism after the Renaissance, the Chinese humanist Marxism’s critique of Mao’s socialism expedited the “secular” movement in Chinese society: the development of the capitalist market process’ (Wang Hui, 1995: 16–17). 26 Xu Jilin has similarly used the expression ‘secularised socialism’ to describe the politics of post-Mao China (Xu Jilin, 2004a: 184). Tao Dongfeng maintains that a difference between Western humanism and the Chinese spirit of the Humanities is that the first opposes religion, while the latter opposes ‘secularisation’ (Tao Dongfeng, 2012). When used with reference to cultural change, ‘secularisation’ denoted the process of rejecting two tenets in cultural and especially literary production. The first is that literature has a sacred mission as a carrier of ethical values and political ideals, and it derives its importance and dignity from serving this purpose. 27 The second is the humanist’s sense of being part of an elite that distinguishes itself from the common populace by dint of higher ideals. 28 The boom of an entertainment culture for the masses and the ‘commodification’ of literature undermined both tenets (Shu Ye, 2009).